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STATEMENT BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE MONTANA

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
By

David R. Mason

I shall talk about administration under the "Montana Plan," with

special reference to the administration of the judicial system at the
supreme and district court levels.
Need for court administration: present provisions

When we talk about the "Montana Plan" we talk about a unified court

system - a system designed to work efficiently in Montana, with our

sparsely populated and remote areas, avoiding unused or unnecessary
judicial machinery and personnel and yet affording ready accessibility
to the public.

Business like management and coordination of services

under self-contained centralized authority is essential tu a modern

judicial system.
This concept finds expression in our present Constitution.

Thus,

Article VIII, sec. 2, provides that the Supreme Court "shall have
general supervisory control over all inferior courts, under such rules

and limitations as may be prescribed by law."

This latter clause has

.

little practical significance, since it does not permit the legislature

to decrease the power granted to the Supreme Court, and the legislature

has never undertaken to prescribe the procedure or time for its exercise.
Under this general supervisory control, the Supreme Court may mandamus
a judge in a single judge district to perform his duties and, if he

fails to do so, muy order a judge from another judicial district to
perform those duties.

Further, the Supreme Court may apportion business

among district judges of a multiple judge district, if they fail to
make their own apportionment.
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But the trouble with the present Constitution is that it does
not provide for integral, continuous administrative control or supervision

by the Supreme Court of the court system.

The fact is that the present

supervisory power of the Supreme Court operates principally to keep
inferior courts within their respective jurisdictions and prevent

abuses of such jurisdictions in individual cases.
There is no provision contemplating the collection and compilation
of data respecting court facilities and personnel, systems used by clerks
of court and probation officers, fiscal requirements, and the like.

There

is no provision for an administrator to aid the Supreme Court in its
supervisory functions.

There is no power whatever to divide the state

into districts, or determine the number of judges for each district.

The

latter powers are expressly placed in the legislature.
I cannot say that there is any devastating consequences of these
inadequacies at present.

Our courts are current on cases before them.

But as the population of the state increases, judicial congestion and
consequent delay in the adminis ration of justice may be expected to

become a problem, as it has in other states.
And we do not have a well balanced judiciary.

The population of the

18 districts varies greatly, one having about 12 times that of another; and
the area also varies greatly, one having more than 30 times the area of
another.

The number of district judges varies from 1 to 3 in the districts,

but this does not equalize caseloads.

A study made in 1966 showed that the

per judge caseload in ' ne district was more than 4 times that in another.
The system operates because judges in districts with lighter case

loads have been willing to assume jurisdiction of cases outside their own

districts when asked to do so.

But we certainly should not depend upon
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a system of voluntary equalization.

Our cooperative judges will not live

forever, and no one can foresee the attitude of their successors.
Of course, figures on population, areas and judge caseloads do
not tell the whole story, because,among other things, they don’t take

account of the type of case handled in the different districts.

But I

have never known of any effort to evaluate the differences in types of
cases, and I don’t think anyone knows exactly what part the type of case
may play in the real per judge caseload.

The fact is that machinery for such evaluations simply does not

exist.

Our present districting and allotment of judges is the result

of infrequent legislative determinations to meet the complaints and

demands of particular districts.

There is no continuing or overall

study or supervision of such matters, to assure a judicial system which

will efficiently deliver justice throughout the state.

No constitution can provide detailed rules to accomplish an efficient
judicial system geared to meet changing requirements.

But a state

constitution should provide the framework for such a system, and I

believe the provisions of the "Montana Plan" do this.

Let’s look at

these provisions.

Provisions in the "Montana Plan"
Section 2 of the "Montana Plan" carries forward the present

provision for supervisory control by the Supreme Court and adds
"administrative" control.

This m .kes it clear that the power of the

Supreme Court is not confined to supervision of the decision making

process, but extends to the management of the court system.

The next

section (3) provides that the Supreme Court may appoint an administrative
director and staff, who shall serve at the court’s pleasure, to assist
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the court and the Chief Justice in the performance of administrative
duties.

Then section 4 empowers the court to make rules and regulations

relating to judicial administration.

and not mandatory.

Note that these powers are permissive

The various and complicated problems involved in

court administration require continuous and comprehensive study which

the court may not be able to do without assistance.

The provisions permitting

the appointment of an administrator and staff are aspects of self-contained
centralized authority.
Some major problems in the management of an efficient court system,
to which I have referred, are identified in other sections.

Section 10

deals with the districting of the state and the determination of the number

of judges in each district.

legislative action.

You will note that this provides for initial

But the Supreme Court may increase or decrease the

number of judges in any judicial district and divide the state into new

districts, provided that each district be formed of a compact territory

and be bounded by county lines.

Any contention that too much power would

be lodged in the Supreme Court is met by the pr vision that the legislature
may reject changes in districts and the number of judges therein at the
legislative session following the change.

Further, the changes could not

take place more frequently than every 4 years.

Section 9 also should be noted in this connection.

Under it,

the judge or judges of each district may provide for divisions and
assign judges to particular types of cases.

Specialization as the volume

of business permits in such areas as, say, juvenile delinquency proceedings

and small claims litigation, is thus possible.

And again, there is a safe

guard against the creation of divisions where not justified, in the require
ment of approval by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
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To aid in these areas of administration and assure a wide

representation of views, the "Montana Plan" also provides for

continuing studies by a committee composed of laymen as well as
lawyers and judges.

Section 13 provides that the Research and

Qualifications Committee shall conduct continuing studies of the
administration of justice in Montana, which studies® shall include,
but not be limited to, the division of the state into judicial
districts and the number of judges to be assigned to each.

This

broadly based committee would report to the legislature as well as

to the Supreme Court, as the legislature might require.
All in all, we have in the "Montana Plan" provisions for a

flexible, balanced ana efficient system of justice.

The Plan is

geared to future needs as well as present requirements, as an

enduring framework of govern:..ent should be.

Conclusion

Today only 13 states remain without express grant of adminis
trative control to

their highest court, and 17 have made the power

It is time for Montana to act.

constitutional.

Part II - Procedural rule making power
Now I should like to turn to a related but different matter.

I

should like to say a few words about the power of the Supreme Court

to make practice and procedural rules to govern cases tried in our
courts of record.

These rules are the legal instruments for getting substantive
issues before the court for adjudication.

No other department or

agency of government has the thorough knowledge and experience which
equips it to make such rules.
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Section 4 of the "Montana Plan" provides that the Supreme Court has
the power to make rules and regulations, not only relating to judicial

administration, as to which I have spoken, but also relating to practice,
procedure, pleading and evidence.

In 1959 the Montana legislature gave the power to our Supreme Court to
make rules relating to practice, procedure and pleadings in civil cases,
provided that the rules should be effective upon adoption by the legis
lature.

Then in 1963 the legislature removed the proviso.

Court has exercised the power ever since.

The Supreme

On the criminal side, the

power was granted in 1967 but expired in 1969.

The provision in the "Montana Plan" is somewhat broader in language
than these statutes, in that it includes the power to make rules and

regulations respecting "evidence."

But rules of evidence really are an

integral part of rules of procedure.

level.

This is recognized on the federal

A federal enabling act gives to the Supreme Court of the United

States the power to make rules relating to "practice and procedure,'

and

under this the Federal Advisory Committee has regarded rules of evidence
as matters of procedure, and rules of evidence for the federal district
courts are now being considered by the United States Supreme Court.

Section 4 of the "Montana Plan" makes this specific, to avoid any
doubt as to what is included.

Objection is occasionally heard that procedure and substance can’t

be distinguished, and that substantive rules should be left to the
legislature.

It is true that the line between procedure and substance

is sometimes rather shadowy, and I certainly do not think that the court

should have the power to make rules of substantive law.

But I don’t think there is any real danger of this happening under
the provision of the "Montana Plan."

Experience with procedural rule

making power for more than 30 years on the federal level, and for more
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than a dozen years in Montana, has not shown this to be a significant problem.

Actually, the problem has existed ever since the beginning of the federal

Judicial system.

This is because in cases where federal jurisdiction is

based on diversity of citizenship, and in some other cases, the federal
court follows the substantive law of the states while applying federal

procedural rules.

The fact is that a good body of.jurisprudence has grown

up on the distinction between substance and procedure.

We are not in anuntried or dangerous area.

In some states the power

to make procedural rules is regarded as inherent in the highest court of
the state.

It is granted by the constitution in 15 states, and by statute

in 22 more.

Section 4 of the "Montana Plan" would remjve any doubt as to where
the power rests in this state.

It would place the power in the Supreme

Court, which has the knowledge and experience enabling it to make these
technical legal rules.

And it would permit ready adjustment of Montana

procedural rules to those applicable in federal courts, thus permitting

uniformity between the procedures applicable in our state and federal
courts.
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